Global Fishing Watch Provides Training to Peru’s Vessel Surveillance Group

[Originally posted on the Global Fishing Watch blog, Aug. 15, 2018.]

We were very pleased to complete a three day training session this month in Lima with the Peruvian Ministry of Production’s vessel surveillance division. It was an opportunity for us to share the latest developments on the Global Fishing Watch mapping platform and to get expert feedback from professionals in Peru’s fisheries sector.

Since Peru’s public commitment in 2017 to show fishing activity from their Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) tracking data on our map we have engaged with local researchers and regulators to review and improve our data and analysis in the region. This began with a workshop with Peru’s Instituto del Mar de Peru (IMARPE) last December and now continues with Peruvian regulators directly responsible for daily monitoring of one of the world’s largest fisheries (Peruvian anchoveta).

In our most recent training session we highlighted the benefits of being able to view and compare multiple data sources on the Global Fishing Watch map including the new night lights and encounters layers launched in June this year. Many large fishing vessels on the Peruvian coast are covered both by AIS and the Peruvian VMS system. In training, we compared the tracking data from both systems for the same vessel showing how one system may cover a gap in the other.

The new night lights layer also has the potential to be very useful to regulators in combination with tracking data. A fleet of hundreds of Chinese vessels fishing for squid is expected to soon return to the Peruvian EEZ boundary. Individual fishing locations can be seen precisely due to the powerful lights they use to attract squid to the surface. However, to identify the fishing vessels, the night light information has to be combined with tracking and identity information from AIS. In training we identified a number of vessels in the Chinese squid fleet and followed their AIS tracks into port in Peru or to rendezvous with reefers (refrigerated cargo ships) where their catch is likely being transshipped.

As we work to develop new tools and data sources for the Global Fishing Watch map it’s valuable to get the insights of fisheries regulators on how they would like to be able to apply our map. So it was great to be able to wrap up the training with a discussion on features that it would be useful to enable in the future. These included being able to select an area on the map with the mouse and display a list of vessels inside and downloading reports of past activity for individual vessels as they come into port.

A special thanks to José Luis Herrera and Nilton Yarmas for coordinating the training. We also benefited greatly from the assistance of Eloy Aroni Sulca of Oceana’s Lima office who demonstrated many interesting potential applications of Global Fishing Watch in Peru. We look forward to hearing more in the future from participants in our training course and collaborating with them for successful monitoring and management of Peru’s ocean resources.

Illegal transshipment of fish between Saly Reefer and Flipper 4 fishing vessel. (Photo courtesy of Greenpeace.)

Machine learning and satellite data provide the first global view of transshipment activity

[This post originally appeared on the Global Fishing Watch blog.]
Illegal transshipment of fish between Saly Reefer and Flipper 4 fishing vessel. (Photo courtesy of Greenpeace.)

Illegal transshipment of fish between Saly Reefer and Flipper 4 fishing vessel. (Photo courtesy of Greenpeace.)

This week marks the publication of the first-ever global assessment of transshipment in a scientific journal. Researchers at Global Fishing Watch and SkyTruth, in the journal Frontiers of Marine Science, published “Identifying Global Patterns of Transshipment Behavior.”

What is transshipment? Why does it matter? What have we learned and what remains unknown? Read on to find out.

Vessels may meet at sea for a number of reasons, such as to refuel, to exchange crew, or to deliver supplies. In the commercial fishing industry, vessels also meet to transfer catch in a process known as transshipment. Huge vessels with refrigerated holds – some large enough to hold over 100 US school buses – collect catch from multiple fishing boats at sea to carry back to port.

By enabling fishing vessels to remain on the fishing grounds, transshipment reduces fuel costs and ensures faster delivery of catch to port. As a result, many vessels that fish in the high seas or in waters far from their home ports engage in the practice. Unfortunately, it also leaves the door open for mixing illegal catch with legitimate catch, drug smuggling, forced labor and human rights abuses. Fishing vessels can remain at sea for months or even years at a time, enabling captains to keep their crew at sea indefinitely and, in some cases, resulting in de facto slavery. As a pathway for illegal catch to enter the global market (an estimated $23.5 billion worth of fish annually worldwide is illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU)), transshipment prevents an accurate measurement of the amount of marine life being taken from the sea. It obscures the seafood supply chain from hook to port and hobbles efforts to manage fisheries sustainably. Occurring far from shore and out of sight, transshipment activities have traditionally been hard to manage and relatively invisible. Data on transshipment has been virtually nonexistent, proprietary, and rarely shared publicly – until now.

With generous support from the Walton Family Foundation, Global Fishing Watch and SkyTruth are applying machine learning and satellite data to study global transshipment patterns and shine a light on what has historically been an opaque practice. Previously, no public, global database of transshipment vessels existed. So, as a first step to understand global transshipment activity, we developed one, combining data from vessel registries, hard-nosed internet investigations, and applying machine learning techniques to identify potential transshipment vessels. This first public, carrier vessel database includes roughly 680 vessels, predominated by large vessels operating within Russian waters or the high seas tuna/squid fleets.

In the Indian Ocean, off the remote Saya de Malha bank, the refrigerated cargo vessel (reefer) Leelawadee was seen with two unidentified likely fishing vessels tied alongside. Image Captured by DigitalGlobe on Nov. 30, 2016. Credit: DigitalGlobe © 2017. Image by DigitalGlobe via SkyTruth.

In the Indian Ocean, off the remote Saya de Malha bank, the refrigerated cargo vessel (reefer) Leelawadee was seen with two unidentified likely fishing vessels tied alongside. Image Captured by DigitalGlobe on Nov. 30, 2016. Credit: DigitalGlobe © 2017. Image by DigitalGlobe via SkyTruth.

With databases of fishing and transshipment vessels sorted, the next challenge was to identify where these vessels met at sea. To do this, the team analyzed over 30 billion vessel tracking signals (Automatic Identification System (AIS) messages) to identify potential transshipment encounters. AIS is a collision avoidance system that transmits a vessel’s location at sea and these transmissions are collected by land and satellite-based receivers and delivered to Global Fishing Watch for automated processing. Nearly all large transshipment vessels carry AIS making it possible to identify all locations where they loiter at sea long enough to receive a transshipment, or locations where two vessels (a transshipment vessel and a fishing vessel) are in close proximity long enough to transfer catch, crew or supplies.

Applying these two methods, we have presented the first open-source and global view of transshipment. We found that over half of transshipment behavior identified using AIS may occur in the high seas and these are generally associated with regions of reduced management and oversight. This lax oversight extends to the vessels involved in potential transshipments, with nearly half of the transshipment vessels we have identified registered to flags of convenience (countries with reduced oversight and limited connection to the vessel, if you’re interested this blog post has more details). As regulations for transshipment vary widely, the data alone do not suggest illegality, but reveal patterns and hotspots of activity, the vessels involved, and provides a new perspective which can further investigations around specific incidents and inform general policy discussions.

Global Fishing Watch’s new encounters layer reveals for the first time where and when thousands of vessels are involved in close encounters at sea. 

We are only just beginning to see the true impact of this unprecedented dataset, but already it has been used to identify vessels potentially involved in catching sharks that were illegally transported through the Galapagos (described here) and in an upcoming scientific paper by research collaborators at Dalhousie University, identifying those fisheries that most heavily utilize transshipment. Our partner, Oceana also analyzed the data in their report that identified patterns of likely transshipping, top ports visited by these vessels and vessels at sea for more than 500 days. Additionally, our models have been incorporated into recent efforts to estimate the costs and profitability of high seas fishing (described here), a set of potential transshipments have been incorporated as a layer within the Global Fishing Watch public map (here) and our work has supported investigations into human right abuses within fishing fleets (Greenpeace, 2018).

Our next steps involve extending these analyses to include “bunker” vessels which provide fuel to fishing vessels at sea, which along with transshipment vessels, play a critical role in supporting high seas, distant water fishing. Combining bunkering (refueling) and transshipment events, with vessel identities (owners/operators and flag states) and additional vessel events including port visits, we will identify the social network at sea. With generous support from the Walmart Foundation, over the coming years we will also explore transshipment in tuna fisheries, analysing and mapping activities that enable global tuna fleets to stay at sea for long periods without oversight. We hope this work will help global efforts to combat illegal and unsustainable tuna fishing.

The publication of this unprecedented dataset provide the first view of the global patterns of transshipment and is the first step towards greater transparency in a previously difficult to track activity. By making the underlying data freely available it can be used by governments, NGOs and academia to support both regional and global efforts to strengthen monitoring and enforcement to eliminate IUU fishing.

Sediment or Oil?

You may recall we posted about a slick emerging from an unidentified platform off the coast of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on June 4th. At the time, we noted that the slick was most likely directed by the strong currents from the nearby entrance to the Congo River as it wasn’t in line with the wind direction. In this image from June 28, we now see a second slick alongside the first.

Sentinel 1 imagery showing the slicks visible with Synthetic Aperture Radar.

This could be a sign of new construction in the area. We also noticed a slick closer to shore which led us to check Sentinel 2 imagery which allows us to see in the visual spectrum. In the inset image, from June 8th, we can see that there are long, brown trails coming from the platforms, usually a sign of sediment being kicked up by wake turbulence from strong currents hitting the structures.

Detailed view of one of the trails in Sentinel 2 imagery.

This raises the possibility that the slicks we are seeing on the radar images are not from oil but from sediment plumes. Turbidity and sediment in the water can dampen wind-driven wavelets, just like an oil slick, making a dark slick on a radar image. The fact that the wind was very low in these images, between 0-5 knots, could possibly emphasize the sediment plumes against the slack water, making them more visible than usual.

The original slick we reported on in June.

However, the way that these slicks remain coherent over 50km lends weight to them being comprised of an oily substance, especially the feathering pattern seen in the middle. This is consistent with what we expect from wind and currents pulling an oily slick in different directions.  So another possibility is that we’re seeing the intentional discharge of drilling fluids and/or “produced water” that includes residual amounts of oil.

In the end, we cannot say with certainty what we are seeing in these images. There is evidence supporting chronic leaking or discharge from the platforms, but there is also support for these being trails of sediment, kicked up by the strong currents coming from the Congo River. It’s times like this that we need some ground truth to help solve the mystery.

Pipeline Failure Cause of Fatal Oil Spill in Indonesia

An oil spill this weekend that caught fire in Balikpapan Bay, Indonesia, claimed the lives of five fishermen.  State authorities initially reported the fire was set intentionally by oil-spill responders in an attempt to burn it off, a claim that was later denied.

The bulk of the slick can be seen escaping the bay in these satellite images.  In this first image, one of Planet’s Dove satellites has captured variations in the thickness of the slick. We can see narrow, dark tendrils of oil surrounded by the lighter sheen and thinner layers of the slick. In places, the edges of the slick appear dark in contrast to the cleaner water as the oil smoothes out the surface by suppressing small wavelets produced by the wind. Even though the thinner layer of oil isn’t directly visible, we can still see the textural effect it has on the water’s surface, reducing the amount of sunglint (glitter) reflecting off the water:

PlanetScope image courtesy of Planet, April 2, 2018.

This often subtle difference in roughness between clean and oiled water is why the European Space Agency’s Sentinel 1 Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) is also an excellent tool for spotting slicks, as we can see in the image below. Radar distinguishes sharply between the smooth, oily water and the wind-rippled, clean water, and can see right through the clouds, giving us a clear view of the extent of the spill. This Sentinel 1 image was taken on April 1, one day before the Planet image, illustrating how the winds and current have moved the slick around:

Sentinel 1 image courtesy of European Space Agency, April 1, 2018. Bright spots in the water are vessels, most at anchor. 

Initially, authorities were zeroed in on a bulk cargo vessel, the Ever Judger, as the source of this spill.  We can understand why — the PlanetScope satellite image from April 2 shows the vessel anchored in Balikpapan Bay almost directly on top of one end of the slick:

Detail from PlanetScope image taken April 2, 2018, showing large red cargo ship near oil slick in Balikpapan Bay. Red dot at south end of ship shows the location of an AIS (Automatic Identification System) signal that was broadcast on April 1 from the bulk carrier Ever Judger. We assume the vessel has been anchored at this location. Image courtesy Planet.  AIS data courtesy ShipView / exactEarth.

But officials from Pertamina, the Indonesian state oil company, have come forward to say the spill was caused by the failure of a pipeline beneath the bay.  This pipe, installed in 1998, carries crude oil from a storage terminal on the west side of the bay to a refinery in Balikpapan.  We’ve looked for maps showing the route of this pipeline and, so far, struck out. Based on examination of the latest high-resolution imagery of the area in Google Earth (from October 2016), and knowing the locations of the terminal and the refinery (thanks to Google Maps), we’ve sketched in our best guess at where this pipeline may be located:

Map showing our best guess at the alignment of the pipeline that failed, resulting in fatal oil spill in Balikpapan Bay.

If anyone has more definitive information on this pipeline, or the precise location of the failure, please share!  Over the next few days we will continue to monitor this incident with satellite imagery, thanks to our friends at Planet and the European Space Agency.

[UPDATE April 5 – Pertamina claims the spill resulted when the Ever Judger dropped anchor without authorization in Balikpapan Bay, dragging and breaking their pipeline.]

Reefer Fined $5.9 Million for Endangered Catch in Galapagos Recently Rendezvoused with Chinese Longliners

The reefer Fu Yuan Yu Leng 999 is intercepted by the Ecuadorian Navy on August 13, 2017. Image accessed at: Armada del Ecuador.

Today the government of Ecuador took a strong environmental stance with its sentence for the Fu Yuan Yu Leng 999, a Chinese refrigerated cargo ship (reefer) caught in the Galapagos with the remains of more than 6,000 sharks, including endangered hammerheads. Catching or transporting sharks within the Galapagos Reserve is illegal. The incident set off widespread protests in the Galapagos and in the cities of Quito and Guayaquil. The large fine, coupled with a prison sentence of four years for the vessel’s captain shows the determination of Ecuadorians to defend this unique marine environment.

Along with our partners at Global Fishing Watch, we have taken a detailed look at the past activity of this vessel and found the reefer rendezvoused with a fleet of Chinese longliners in the week just before the vessel’s detention.  

According to news reports, a chance sighting of a Chinese cargo vessel within the Galapagos Marine Reserve on Saturday, August 12th, led to a chase and the eventual detention of the vessel by the Ecuadorean Navy the following day. During the hearings, two vessels were named as providing the catch, reported as the Taiwanese vessels Hai Fang 301 and Hai Fang 302. The catch transshipment reportedly occurred between August 5th and 7th more than a thousand miles west of the Galapagos.

Our AIS tracking data does confirm vessel rendezvous on the dates reported but not with the vessels named. The Fu Yuan Yu Leng 999 is seen departing Fuzhou on the Chinese coast on July 7th and then transiting directly across the Pacific toward Ecuador. On August 5th at a remote location in the Eastern Pacific 1700 miles west of the Galapagos, the Fu Yuan Yu Leng 999 stopped and spent the next three days moving at a slow speed.

Rendezvous between the Fu Yuan Yu Leng 999 (black) and four Chinese longliners, Fu Yuan Yu 7866 (blue), Fu Yuan Yu 7861 (green), Fu Yuan Yu 7865 (purple), and Fu Yuan Yu 7862 (yellow). The longliners can be seen to each rendezvous with the reeefer for about 12 hours between August 5th and August 7th, 2017. (image by Global Fishing Watch, August , 2017)

Checking for vessels in the vicinity, I found a fleet of four Chinese longliners moving alongside the Fu Yuan Yu Leng 999 in very close proximity, the Fu Yuan Yu 7866, 7861, 7865, and 7862. No vessels identifying as Hai Fang (more likely Hai Feng) are seen in the vicinity. With distances of only 30 meters between the Fu Yuan Yu Leng 999 and the Fu Yuan Yu longliners, it appears the longliners were tied up to the cargo vessel with each longliner spending about 12 hours attached to the reefers. These lengthy rendezvous at sea suggest a substantial transfer of cargo was possible.

 

Vessel

IMO

Callsign

MMSI

Fu Yuan Yu 7866 9828716 BVYT7 412440549
Fu Yuan Yu 7861 9828663 BVYX7 412440551
Fu Yuan Yu 7865 9828704 BVYS7 412440558
Fu Yuan Yu 7862 9828675 BVYY7 412440552

Details of rendezvous between the Fu Yuan Yu Leng 999 and the four Fu Yuan Yu longliners. Click on the listed vessel names above for the individual tracks. (image by Global Fishing Watch, August , 2017)

The four Fu Yuan Yu longliners were fishing on the high seas in the Eastern Pacific for the three months prior to rendezvousing with the Fu Yuan Yu Leng 999. Click to view vessel tracks in Global Fishing Watch.

The practice of at sea transshipment of catch between fishing vessels and refrigerated cargo ships is common but can result in the mixing of fish caught legally and illegally. Transshipment also enables vessel operators to keep their crew at sea for many months on end where they may face abusive labor conditions or even slavery. Transshipments on the high seas are regulated by Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMO’s).

The Fu Yuan Yu Leng 999 can be seen rendezvousing with the Chinese longline vessels within the area of the eastern Pacific regulated by the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC). While the four Chinese longliners are currently authorized to fish by the IATTC, a recent publication of a list of carrier vessels authorized by the IATTC does not include the Fu Yuan Yu Leng 999.

Following the track of the Fu Yuan Yu Leng 999, the vessel reached the edge of the Galapagos EEZ on August 12th. At this point, the track of the vessel is broken up by some AIS transmission errors resulting in several extended periods where no location for the vessel came through. While this seemed suspicious, it was possible to check the length of these gaps in the vessel’s track and determine the vessel maintained an average speed of around 10 knots during the hours when the vessel was not trackable. This 10-knot speed matches the vessel’s normal transit speed, and for this reason, it seems unlikely that the Fu Yuan Yu Leng 999 could have stopped to transship with any local vessels in the vicinity of the Galapagos.

The Fu Yuan Yu Leng 999 entered the Galapagos EEZ area on August 12th. Several long gaps occur due to faulty AIS transsmision but our analysis shows that the vessel likely maintained a normal transit speed during these gaps. The vessel was then intercepted on the 13th. To the southeast more than one hundred Chinese squid vessels cluster near the EEZ boundary. This fleet has moved north from typical fishing grounds at the edge of Peru’s EEZ. Includes material © 2017 exactEarth Ltd. All Rights Reserved.

Checking the Fu Yuan Yu Leng 999’s track over the past few years shows the vessel was operating in a few locations where suspicious or unregulated fishing activity has been documented. These locations include the northwest Indian Ocean with an unregulated squid fleet through 2016 as documented in a report by Fish-i Africa and East Timor where Chinese vessels expelled from Indonesia have relocated.

Given the history of the Fu Yuan Yu Leng 999, we are encouraged to see the vessel held accountable for its crimes by the Ecuadorian authorities. Our analysis shows four Fu Yuan Yu longliners are likely the source of the catch confiscated from the Fu Yuan Yu Leng 999. We hope these vessels will also be sanctioned for illegally transferring catch and regulators will take further action to monitor and restrict transshipment at-sea.

Read more details on this story on the blog of our partner Global Fishing Watch.

 

 

Mapping Oil Pollution Hot Spots in the World’s Oceans

We’ve embarked on an ambitious new project with the help of our stellar team of summer interns (Brady Burker, Flynn Robinson and Brian Wong). We set out to systematically identify and monitor ‘hot spots’ of oil pollution in the world’s oceans.  

Using freely available satellite imagery, we have identified and mapped several representative ‘hot spots’ of three major sources of oil pollution threatening the health of the world’s oceans and coasts: the illegal dumping of oily wastes at sea (also known as bilge dumping), persistent leaks from aging or damaged oil and gas production infrastructure, and long-term vessel anchorages where dozens of small spills and leaks on a nearly daily basis create chronic pollution conditions.

You can find the report here.

Free satellite imagery is becoming increasingly useful for systematically detecting and monitoring oil pollution in the world’s oceans.  Building from the methods and case studies outlined herein, our goal is to develop a semi-automated daily ocean monitoring platform.  This imagery will remain a core resource for this work. We will also seek to leverage high temporal and spatial resolution commercial imagery resources in order to create a clearer picture of the sources, causes and consequences of oil pollution at sea, and to empower and engage environmental advocates and concerned citizens to protect their oceans and coasts.

Image credit: A “vessel of opportunity” skims oil spilled after the Deepwater Horizon/BP well blowout in the Gulf of Mexico in April 2010. (NOAA Office of Response and Restoration)

The Liverpool Bay oil & gas infrastructure funnels through the Douglas Complex (ENI Liverpool Bay Operating Company, 2016)

ENI — Italian Firm Recently Approved for Offshore Exploration in Alaska — Responsible for Last Week’s UK Oil Spill

Blobs of oil and balls of tar washed ashore in northwestern England last week. The oily litter impacted a 15 kilometer stretch of coastline and originated from an OSI (offshore storage installation) that receives oil from the Douglas Complex, an offshore triple-platform central to the Liverpool Bay oil and gas production operations seen below.

The Liverpool Bay oil & gas infrastructure funnels through the Douglas Complex (ENI Liverpool Bay Operating Company, 2016)

The Liverpool Bay oil & gas infrastructure funnels through the Douglas Complex (ENI Liverpool Bay Operating Company, 2016)

The Douglas Complex is integral to the Liverpool Bay’s network because all oil and gas collected by its four satellite sites (Lennox, Hamilton, Hamilton East, and Hamilton North) is funneled through the Complex for processing. Natural gas products are then re-directed ashore to the Point of Ayr Gas Terminal and crude oil to the OSI. It was this latter-most connection, an oil tanker anchored in place, that failed in Liverpool Bay on July 10, 2017.

Radar imagery from  ESA’s Sentinel-1 satellite appears to show the slick resulting from this spill, as it drifts away from the storage tanker and heads toward shore. ASCAT satellite-derived surface wind data from the time of the spill confirms the wind was blowing from the north and east, consistent with the trajectory seen in these images. A spokesperson claimed that between 630-6,300 gallons of oil leaked; our conservative estimate, based on the size of the slick and an assumed average thickness of 1 micron, show this to be at least 6,843 gallons. Also note the half-mile gap between the OSI and a safety response vessel, the Vos Inspirer, on July 11 in the image that matches AIS vessel tracking data. An educated guess would be that the leak originated under water, potentially from the pipeline leading from the Douglas Complex, from the riser pipe from the seafloor to the OSI, or from the seafloor junction between the two.

Radar imagery from  ESA’s Sentinel-1 satellite appears to show the slick resulting from this spill, as it drifts away from the storage tanker and heads toward shore

Radar imagery from ESA’s Sentinel-1 satellite appears to show the slick resulting from this spill, as it drifts away from the storage tanker and heads toward shore.

U.S. Arctic Offshore Energy Policy Context

ENI, the Italian oil firm that accepted responsibility for the Liverpool Bay oil spill was recently granted access to drill for oil in US waters in Alaska’s Beaufort Sea. This approval comes on the back of President Trump’s executive order that recently reversed a permanent ban on new offshore drilling.

The policy change has faced substantial criticism from environmental heavy-weights, culminating in a lawsuit filed by Earthjustice, NRDC, Center for Biological Diversity, League of Conservation Voters, REDOIL, Alaska Wilderness League, Northern Alaska Environmental Center, Greenpeace, Sierra Club, and The Wilderness Society to challenge the executive order’s legality.

Risk, Risk, Risk.

Beyond legal concerns, one would be remiss not to acknowledge the intrinsic risk of Arctic drilling. ENI reported the UK spill to be up to 6,300 gallons, and this took place in a very favorable location for clean-up. But experts agree we are ill-prepared for an oil spill in the markedly less forgiving conditions of the Arctic. The head of the U.S. Coast Guard, Adm. Paul Zukunft, recently commented on the topic by saying:

We saw during Deepwater Horizon, whenever the seas are over four feet, our ability to mechanically remove oil was virtually impossible…Four-foot seas up there [in the Arctic] would probably be a pretty darned good day, so certainly environmental conditions weigh heavily in addition to just the remoteness.”

ENI might learn from Shell Oil’s failures. Shell canned a $7 billion offshore drilling project in Alaska’s Chukchi Sea after determining it was not financially worthwhile. Economic risk factors are furthered by International Energy Agency reports of an oil-supply “glut” and lowering crude prices amidst the rise of both renewable energy, and cheaper oil produced by fracking onshore.

Between supply-side risk, threats of lawsuits, and low oil prices, ENI is diving head first into a complicated, high-risk pool. Off the Fylde coast, authorities were quick to execute a plan after locals immediately brought the situation to their attention. As the Coast Guard continues to advocate for the basic resources needed for emergency preparedness and response in the Arctic, is this a gamble worth taking?